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COM MEN TARY
CHANG ING IN TER RO GA TION FA CIL ITY MAN AGE MENT TO DE FEAT THE
EN EMY
Vir ginia Cruse
“Abu Ghraib,” “Guantanamo,” “wa ter board ing,” and “tor ture” are po lit i cally
charged and evo ca tive terms that bring to mind in ter ro ga tion. Nine years into
the Af ghan i stan and Iraq wars (though the “com bat phase” of the lat ter has re -
cently ended), stren u ous de bate con tin ues over the ef fi cacy of hu man in tel li -
gence (HUMINT) tech niques em ployed to ob tain crit i cal in for ma tion. It is my
def i nite sense that this de bate has be come so po lit i cally charged as to be coun ter -
pro duc tive. Since in ter ro ga tion of ten pro vides the es sen tial el e ments of in for -
ma tion in asym met ri cal-war fare anal y sis, per haps the time has come to end the
de bate and ask the ques tion, “How is the mil i tary in tel li gence (MI) com mu nity
pre par ing and sup port ing its in ter ro ga tors for the fu ture?” Now is the time for
MI to en act sig nif i cant struc tural changes in in ter ro ga tion-fa cil ity man age ment
to en able ex ploit ers more ef fec tively while pro vid ing nec es sary over sight. These
struc tural changes should in clude an in creased un der stand ing of com plex
prison so cial sys tems and the uti li za tion of cen tral or ches tra tion of in ter ro ga -
tion op er a tions.
By way of in tro duc tion, in ter ro ga tion can gen er ally be di vided into two dis tinct
cat e go ries—tac ti cal and booth. “Tac ti cal in ter ro ga tion,”
some times re ferred to as “mo bile in ter ro ga tion,” takes
place in the op er at ing en vi ron ment—that is, in the field
or at the tac ti cal ob jec tive. Its aim is to ex ploit quickly
time-sen si tive, per ish able in for ma tion for the mis-
sion com mander. Should the tac ti cal team iden tify a
high-value in di vid ual (HVI)—one who is known or
sus pected to be di rectly in volved in ter ror ist or en emy
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op er a tions—it will gen er ally trans port the HVI to a hold ing fa cil ity for fur ther
ques tion ing. This leads to the sec ond cat e gory of in ter ro ga tion, which I will call
“booth in ter ro ga tion,” since the in ter ro ga tion booth in tra di tional hold ing fa cil -
i ties is the des ig nated area for ques tion ing that fo cuses on both the tac ti cal and
larger op er a tional pic tures. Booth in ter ro ga tion is gen er ally long-term, works
mul ti ple pri or ity in tel li gence re quire ments, and is stag ger ingly com pli cated
when com pared to tac ti cal in ter ro ga tion.
Once trans ferred from the tac ti cal team and made a de tainee, the HVI be -
comes part of an in tri cate so cial sys tem that in volves in ter ro ga tors, se cu rity per -
son nel, clergy, med i cal staff, nongovernmental or ga ni za tions and out side
agency rep re sen ta tives, trans la tors, ad min is tra tors, an a lysts, and, most im por -
tant, other de tain ees. While the Army field man ual (FM) 2-22.3, which guides all 
De part ment of De fense in ter ro ga tion, de votes par tic u lar at ten tion to ef fec tive
com mu ni ca tion with guards and the use of in ter pret ers, it does not fo cus on the
larger so cial sys tem.1
Un der stand ing the ef fects of this so cial sys tem is vi tal to a suc cess ful in ter ro -
ga tion. It is a sys tem that many ter ror ists have been trained to work to their ad -
van tage. This train ing takes the form of printed train ing man u als and doc trine,
on line dis cus sion fo rums or chat rooms, and even e-mag a zines and au to bio -
graph i cal ac counts that tu tor ter ror ists in how to “tri umph over in ter ro ga tors.”2
Since the en emy un der stands how to use the com plex so cial sys tems within
an in ter ro ga tion fa cil ity to his ad van tage, it is rea son able that the MI com mu -
nity should ex am ine this as pect in greater depth as well and make the changes
nec es sary to le ver age all the mov ing parts of this sys tem in a way that will give in -
ter ro ga tors the great est ad van tage.
ISO LA TION EF FECT AND REP U TA TION MAN AGE MENT
A tra di tional in ter ro ga tion fa cil ity is rel a tively iso lated from the com bat zone.
Once a de tainee is taken into its cus tody, the United States be comes re spon si ble
for his wel fare.3 Con duct ing in ter ro ga tion op er a tions away from the tac ti cal ob -
jec tive is nec es sary for se cu rity; also, the iso la tion pro duces a fishbowl ef fect. All
per son nel who work the mis sion, from clergy to guards to in tel li gence an a lysts,
work and live to gether and, de pend ing on the se cu rity pa ram e ters, there may be
lit tle out side in ter ac tion.
The iso la tion in flu ences in ter per sonal re la tion ships within the fa cil ity, and
the de tain ees take note of that. While I am not sug gest ing that the fa cil ity staff
de lib er ately shares in for ma tion with de tain ees, de tain ees cer tainly talk to each
other and com pare notes about ev ery thing they see.4 Se cu rity forces, for ex am -
ple, in ter act with the de tain ees sim ply be cause of their prox im ity, and in ter pret -
ers build fun da men tal bonds with de tain ees through lan guage and, of ten,
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 1, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/9
re li gion.5 Even in for mal re la tion ships be tween staff and in ter ro ga tors can have
the po ten tial ei ther to sab o tage or to pro mote an in ter ro ga tor’s in tel li gence col -
lec tion mis sion in side the booth. When an in ter ro ga tor en ters the booth to con -
duct ques tion ing, it is likely that he is al ready a known en tity to the de tainee.
This makes an in ter ro ga tor’s rep u ta tion among the pop u la tion as im por tant
as his rap port with the in di vid ual—maybe more so, de pend ing on the value a
spe cific de tainee group places on char ac ter. “Rep u ta tion man age ment,” there -
fore, be comes par a mount for suc cess ful in tel li gence col lec tion. Word of how an
in ter ro ga tor in ter acts with a de tainee or a fa cil ity staff mem ber spreads quickly,
es pe cially to the de tain ees them selves.
While iso la tion may ap pear to be a dis ad van tage for man ag ing a de tainee
pop u la tion’s per cep tions, se clu sion can pro vide a unique op por tu nity. The
fishbowl ef fect is ide ally fa vor able in highly con trolled, well struc tured en vi ron -
ments that can le ver age cen ters of in flu ence by de sign. An ex am ple of this is boot 
camp.
SEND IN THE MA RINES
The mil i tary is ad ept in “break ing” peo ple and gain ing their loy alty. While this is
ac com plished dur ing re cruit train ing, a sim i lar method could be ef fec tively used 
in in ter ro ga tion fa cil i ties. Re cruit train ing is char ac ter ized by a tre men dous
struc ture, a rigid sched ule, and in doc tri na tion that is led by a group of drill in -
struc tors play ing spe cific roles in the trans for ma tion of ci vil ians into ser vice
mem bers. A com pa ra ble struc ture in a de ten tion fa cil ity could cre ate an econ -
omy of force and max i mize in tel li gence col lec tion.
Drill in struc tors are trained to work as a team and are as signed such spe cific
roles as “the nur turer,” “the heavy,” “the pa ren tal fig ure,” etc. They por tray their
spe cific roles know ing they will have tre men dous ef fects on the group, as one
role plays off the oth ers. One could say it is the most ef fec tive “Mutt and Jeff,” or
“good cop, bad cop,” tech nique in ex is tence. The suc cess ful ma nip u la tion of the
group is de pend ent on drill in struc tors’ ef fi cacy and on their abil ity to work to -
gether, as well as with all out side staff. More over, they are bound in pur pose by a
solid code of eth ics and strong lead er ship.
OR CHES TRAT ING A LARGER EF FORT
A cen tral ized “drill in struc tor” model within an in ter ro ga tion fa cil ity could tie
to gether sev eral small-team ef forts, uti liz ing the in ter ro ga tors’ strengths and
weak nesses and man ag ing de tainee per cep tions of those in ter ro ga tors prior to
booth ques tion ing.
At pres ent, in ter ro ga tion plan ning is of ten lim ited to the con cept of a small
team, or “ti ger team.” In ter ro ga tor-an a lyst teams sub mit their in ter ro ga tion
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plans to a su per vi sor for ap proval. Once a plan is ap proved, how ever, su per vi sors 
do not or ches trate how in ter ro ga tors in ter act with oth ers in the de ten tion fa cil -
ity, sim ply be cause their roles are big enough al ready. Su per vi sors are al ready re -
spon si ble for the con duct of sev eral ti ger teams, track ing in tel li gence, and
en sur ing quick dis sem i na tion of tac ti cal in tel li gence, as well as for sev eral other
in tel li gence and ad min is tra tive func tions. Yet suc cess, if de fined by the col lec -
tion of ac tion able in tel li gence, is ul ti mately driven by an in di vid ual in ter ro ga -
tor’s abil ity to ques tion a de tainee, and that abil ity is linked to the in ter ro ga tor’s
rep u ta tion within the fa cil ity.
In this model, ex pe ri enced in ter ro ga tion “leads,” or con duc tors, at tempt to
mit i gate in ex pe ri ence and cap i tal ize on the strengths of in di vid ual in ter ro ga tors 
by as sign ing roles and work ing closely with their teams of in ter ro ga tors to cre ate 
and aug ment in ter ro ga tor rep u ta tions. To this end, a con duc tor would re quire
strong com mand and con trol over all ac tions both in side and out side the booth,
as well as an un der stand ing of the larger so cial sys tem. As with drill in struc tors,
the in ter ro ga tors’ roles would have tre men dous ef fects on the group, and a con -
duc tor, in es sence, would be come the un seen cus to dian of a cen trally or ches -
trated ef fort to in flu ence all mov ing parts and shift cen ters of in flu ence within a
fa cil ity struc ture so as to pro mote in tel li gence col lec tion. This rigid per cep tion
man age ment would en sure that staff and de tain ees be come par tic i pants (if un -
wit tingly) of the over all de sign to sup port in tel li gence col lec tion.
While this high level of per cep tion man age ment is not pos si ble in an or di nary 
set ting, the fishbowl ef fect makes it at tain able in an in ter ro ga tion fa cil ity.
CHANG ING PHI LOS O PHY, COUN TER ING PER CEP TIONS
Ad di tion ally, an or ches trated in ter ro ga tion ef fort driven by strong cen tral lead -
er ship can ex ploit a de tainee’s ex pec ta tions to the in ter ro ga tor’s ad van tage. A
strong con duc tor can rec og nize nu mer ous holes in en emy doc trine or per cep -
tion and act quickly to have the in ter ro ga tors meet or coun ter them. For ex am -
ple, the 179-page field man ual Dec la ra tion of Ji had against the Coun try’s Ty rants,
Mil i tary Se ries, com monly re ferred to as the Man ches ter Doc u ment, was lo cated
by po lice in Man ches ter, Eng land, dur ing a home search of an al-Qa‘ida mem -
ber. It pro vides spe cific guid ance for op er a tives. Les son 17 in structs al-Qa‘ida
op er a tives about what to ex pect and how to or ga nize in a de ten tion fa cil ity.6 As
in any guid ance, it leaves holes for in ter ro ga tors to ex ploit. This is only one in -
stance; ev ery blog, ar ti cle, and fatwa (for mal Is lamic opin ion) con tains holes. A
cen tral ized ef fort can as sure that in ter ro ga tion tac tics, tech niques, and pro ce -
dures (TTPs) adapt as the en emy does, es pe cially given the ad vances in
biometrics, fo ren sics, and poly graph ex am i na tion.
C R U S E 1 4 5
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Strong cen tral ized in ter ro ga tion is achiev able within a highly se lec tive and
rigid pro fes sional struc ture, and the ef fects can be swift. Struc ture ma nip u la tion 
for man age ment of de tainee pop u la tions is noth ing new. In 605 BC, the Bab y lo -
nian em pire cap tured Je ru sa lem. Rather than en slav ing the pop u la tion, King
Nebuchadnezzar in doc tri nated his pris on ers, in struct ing them in Bab y lo nian
lan guage, cul ture, and re li gion. He al lowed them to eat at his ta ble and even gave
them Bab y lo nian names. When the Medo-Per sian em pire over threw the Bab y lo -
nians in 539 BC, Cyrus the Great freed all Bab y lo nian cap tives, but many would
not leave. It is worth not ing that this hap pened in the span of a mod ern life time.
Some where be tween lockdown and “friendly cap tiv ity” a bal ance can be
struck, or ches trated by in ter ro ga tion lead er ship (fully vis i ble only to in ter ro ga -
tion lead er ship), in the rec og ni tion that all staff and de tain ees af fect de tainee ex -
ploi ta tion. This model has the po ten tial not only to shape in tel li gence col lec tion
through in ter ro ga tion in the short term (de liv er ing timely tac ti cal in tel li gence)
but to shift the “hearts and minds par a digm” over a lon ger de ten tion pe riod.
EX PAND ING THE ROLE OF NAVY HUMINT?
Al though the Army has long dom i nated booth in ter ro ga tion op er a tions for the
mil i tary, Navy HUMINT is the ideal ser vice com po nent to in no vate and im ple -
ment such struc tural changes. While the Army has groomed some of the best in -
ter ro ga tion pro fes sion als in the in tel li gence com mu nity, it is an ex cep tion ally
large or ga ni za tion, with a spotty rep u ta tion (think hu man pyr a mids). The Navy
and Ma rine Corps, on the other hand, have con trolled the growth and qual ity of
their HUMINT pro gram through a rig or ous se lec tion pro cess and will ing ness to 
dis miss un fit can di dates from the train ing pro gram. The pro gram is au ton o -
mous, highly spe cial ized, and built on a long-stand ing and suc cess ful model. At
pres ent, Navy and Ma rine Corps in ter ro ga tion train ing fo cuses on tac ti cal in ter -
ro ga tion more than booth in ter ro ga tion, which is un der stand able, given Navy
HUMINT’s mis sion to sup port spe cial op er a tions.
The Navy and Ma rine Corps have an or ga ni za tional cul ture con du cive to
change, since their fo cus on ma neu ver war fare and dis trib uted op er a tions has
forced swift TTP changes in the field for troop pro tec tion and in tel li gence col -
lec tion.7 Ma rine Corps dis trib uted-op er a tions tac tics are anal o gous to the
changes nec es sary for suc cess ful in ter ro ga tion fa cil ity man age ment, “ex er cis ing
tac ti cal ini tia tive and cre ativ ity based on their com mander’s in tent and rap idly
chang ing rules of en gage ment.”8 Due to its cul ture and its qual ity, Navy and Ma -
rine Corps HUMINT can rap idly in te grate change, such as shifts to en emy
counterinterrogation tech niques like those ad ver tised in jihadi chat rooms.
Ex pan sion into booth in ter ro ga tion op er a tions would re quire sig nif i cant
in creases for the Navy and Ma rine Corps HUMINT pro gram; de ten tion
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operations at the bri gade- and di vi sion-level in ter ro ga tion fa cil i ties are la bor-
in ten sive. How ever, this would seem a wise in vest ment. The Navy and Ma rine
Corps HUMINT pro gram is scan dal free, which is re mark able con sid er ing the
cur rent op er at ing en vi ron ment, and it has a dis tinct lack of “bat tle scars.” It is the 
elite, think ing force that can op er ate to shift TTPs suc cess fully in in ter ro ga tion-
fa cil ity man age ment, fuse all-source in tel li gence into sin gle-source op er a tions for
tac ti cal in tel li gence ex ploi ta tion, and shift the “hearts and minds par a digm” in the 
me dium term. 
It is time for the mil i tary in tel li gence com mu nity to con duct a clear-eyed re -
view of its booth in ter ro ga tion tac tics, tech niques, and pro ce dures and to re de -
fine it self. Navy and Ma rine Corps hu man in tel li gence is best poised to lead the
way. 
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